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for review per [redacted]

AIR

EOA-36216 CHADDAISY
JUN-2-1961 CARELM —
CIA/AVI

: Chief of [redacted] Company
ATTN: [redacted]
: Chief, EE

30 April 58

- : Operational/CART
- : Penetration of NSCOPING Security Formations

REFERENCES: A. [redacted] Case.
B. EOMA-19868 dated 13 January 1958.
C. EOMA-91899 dated 14 August 1957.
D. EOMA-906 dated 28 March 1958.

ACTION REQUIRED: For your information, and see paragraphs 3 and 4.

1. There has been recently increased attention to the subject of penetration of NSCOPING security organs. maintained by a number of fortuitous circumstances. For example, [redacted] as a result of liaison contact, virtually offered himself to us and appears to have no ulterior reason for doing so. The correspondence indicates that FOB is not proceeding slowly and methodically on this one. Given the encouragement to both ODYONE and NSCOPING interest in the discovery of such a contact, this is obviously a very suspicious method. Nevertheless, we wish to emphasize the importance of giving very thorough attention to the possibility that each "volunteer" may have been placed in our direction by a hostile service in the hope that we would recruit him and thereby provide convenient A1S cover for what would be essentially a hostile penetration of NSCOPING elements. The possibility of such an approach is, of course, no idle theory since this technique has been successfully used in Germany by the Soviets in several important cases to date. (For example, the Schmidt-Gehrischer-Albert case; the HOFER case illustrates this principle also, but with a reverse twist.)

2. We are sure it is also your view that although penetration of NSCOPING security services is desirable, such efforts must be put in perspective with the BND priorities and the depth of operational commitment of the base CE component concerned. A penetration of a Federal agency is clearly more desirable than of a Land agency, if only for efficiency's sake. On the other hand, although much lower in priority per se, the penetration of a Land agency may be justified if it is vital to the success of a particular base's mission. We are not so far convinced that the [redacted] operation falls in either of these categories, although we have admittedly not yet seen the full scope of his capabilities. The CARELM contact, despite our excellent lead-in to it, and the reference B suggestion, strike us as peripheral to our interests. We are, in short, not interested in this type of penetration on the local level, where in most cases close working relationships would seem to produce the important information we require.

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3. In connection with penetration at the Federal Level, there were and still are as far as we know, a number of identified opportunities in CAVATA previously reported from the field which could stand some closer scrutiny. It is our impression that since the demise of ODCPALS ill-fated CAMPUS operation, CODMK has no active program of this sort. However, no information on which such an effort is based is consistently available to, and to a degree being consciously gathered by, ODCPAL liaison officers. Since this is information to which we should, under NCID 5, have access, we ask you to consider discussing now with NMANDOLIA making certain information available to us for this purpose on request. You will have to determine the form in which this is done, since naturally we would want the specific of our interest to remain as closely held as possible in each individual case.

4. In all cases where actual recruitment is contemplated, however, we deem it most mandatory that the principle of non-attributability to KURARK is maintained. Thus, in connection with opportunities to recruit CAVATA personnel outright, the recruiter should be someone not previously identified as a KURARKER. This in no way inhibits the discreet way paving or softening up process being performed by a liaison officer.

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25 April 1958 /DOP/RM/4

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